Quarterly Report

April 30, 2016

Roumell Asset Management, LLC

First Quarter Summary

Performance Summary

		Annualized as of 3/31/16					Cumulative Return
	1Q 2016	1 Year	3 Year	5 Year	10 Year	Since Inception*	Since Inception*
Roumell Opportunistic Value (Net)	**-1.13%**	**-14.57%**	**-8.77%**	**-3.13%**	**0.29%**	**7.02%**	**222.14%**
60% Russell 2000 Value / 40% Barclays US Govt Credit	2.55%	-3.77%	4.66%	5.96%	5.16%	7.52%	249.20%
S&P 500	1.35%	1.78%	11.82%	11.58%	7.01%	5.00%	131.95%
Russell 2000 Value	1.70%	-7.72%	5.73%	6.67%	4.42%	8.36%	299.57%
Roumell Balanced (Net)	**-0.43%**	**-10.71%**	**-5.78%**	**-1.30%**	**0.85%**	**5.49%**	**151.40%**
Thomson US Balanced Index	1.01%	-2.39%	4.90%	5.67%	4.56%	4.12%	100.78%

**Inception of Roumell Opportunistic Value and Roumell Balanced is 1/1/99.*

Roumell Asset Management, LLC claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®). Ashland Partners & Co. LLP, our independent verifier, completed its examination of the composite performance returns for the period of 1999 (inception) through December 31, 2015. All returns include reinvested dividends and interest. Please refer to the annual disclosure presentations at the end of this letter.

Opportunistically Investing in Closed-End Funds

A closed-end fund (CEF) is a publicly traded investment company that raises a fixed amount of capital through an initial public offering (IPO). The fund is then structured, listed and traded like a stock on a stock exchange. CEFs are regulated by the 1940 Investment Company Act, which significantly limits the amount of leverage a fund can use, among other restrictions. The leverage restriction is particularly attractive to RAM in that it allows us to benefit from the moderate use of leverage without the risks associated with typically far more leveraged finance vehicles like banks, mortgage REITs and, to a lesser extent, business development companies (BDCs).

Closed-end funds commonly trade at a discount to their net asset value (NAV), which is simply the sum of the current market prices of the underlying securities in the portfolio divided by the number of outstanding shares. A closed-end bond fund, for instance, may have an NAV of $11 based on the current market prices of the underlying bonds while the fund's share price is $10, which means the fund could theoretically be liquidated for an immediate 10% gain. However, a discount to NAV is not necessarily a real discount (unless the fund is being immediately liquidated which is rarely the case) without knowledge of how the underlying bonds are being priced, i.e., at a discount or premium to par value. To wit, if the average bond in a CEF is trading in the marketplace at 110, but the fund is trading at a 10% discount to NAV, the effective discount over time is zero since the bonds will eventually mature at par effectively canceling out the discount to NAV with the portfolio's embedded premium over par.

RAM has episodically bought into bond CEFs when we can identify a "double-discount," i.e., the underlying bonds are trading below par and the fund's market price is below NAV. Thus, if a portfolio's bonds are on average priced at 85% of par in the market, and the discount to NAV is 15%, the investor in such a fund is effectively buying the basket of bonds owned by the CEF at 70% of par value. We believe

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this ultimate discount provides a healthy margin of safety given the bond funds we target own high yield paper (senior unsecured bonds or first-lien secured loans issued by high yield company credits). In a CEF unlevered structure, assuming the double discount noted above, 10% of the bonds could default with a recovery of zero and an investor would still receive back 90% of the portfolio's overall par value after having paid just 70% of par value. This gain of nearly 30% would be in addition to the income generated during the holding period, currently 8% to 12% depending on the types of bonds/loans owned by the CEF.

According to J.P. Morgan, the historical average annual default rate for high yield bonds since 1986 is 4.3% and the average recovery rate in a default is 38.5%, i.e., 1.65% in annual net loss to a diversified portfolio of HY over time. We are very likely in front of a higher default cycle as a result of the sizable energy issuance over the past several years and given that the energy industry is deep in bear market territory with steadily rising defaults. In the two funds we purchased in the first quarter and discuss below, Nuveen Global High Yield Fund (JGH) and Nuveen Credit Strategies Income Fund (JQC), we highlight each portfolio's energy exposure. Our investment thesis is that even with above average defaults, our purchase price (effectively 70% of par), provides more than adequate coverage to absorb defaults while producing a highly attractive investment return. Moreover, CEFs greatly benefit from never needing to participate in un-opportunistic selling resulting from client redemptions because of the closed structure.

CEFs using leverage introduces additional dynamics that must be accounted for, namely, fund borrowing costs and the enhanced return (and risk) from owning additional bonds by borrowing against each dollar of equity capital. CEFs can use leverage in the form of debt (such as bank borrowing) or equity (such as preferred stock). For funds raising debt through credit lines or bond issuance, the fund's maximum debt leverage is 33%. Regulations for equity leverage require that preferred share assets be backed by total portfolio assets at least 2 to 1, meaning maximum equity leverage can be as high as 50% (as is also the case with BDCs). Thus, if a CEF has $100 million of equity capital, and borrows a typical amount of $50 million, the fund is capitalized with $150 million. Assuming a 10% default rate (with zero recovery), an investor can now participate in an enhanced return easily absorbing such losses when effectively purchasing the basket of bonds at 70% of par value, as we did in our CEF purchases. Refer to the walk-through analysis below for JGH and JQC to view the dynamics of the math.

In addition to the double discount noted above, leveraged bond CEFs today offer two other distinct advantages versus other publicly traded finance vehicles: the current cost of borrowing for CEFs is very low and CEF fees are substantially less than other finance vehicles (BDCs, mortgage REITS, etc.). To wit, the Nuveen CEFs discussed below have borrowing costs ranging from 1.33% (Libor plus 0.85%) to 1.81%. If Nuveen's JGH purchases a piece of paper yielding 8.33% with borrowed money, the fund nets 7% for its shareholders. In fact, borrowing costs could materially rise while still generating a healthy return to shareholders on the borrowed money bond purchases. Currently, BDCs and REITS are often paying 6% to 8% to borrow money. To be sure, this money is often for longer durations, but in instances where CEFs use longer term debt the cost is still typically materially lower when the borrower is a firm like Nuveen. Moreover, Libor would have to skyrocket for the borrowing costs of CEFs issued from firms like Nuveen to become uneconomic given what they're earning on the purchased paper. Effectively, in today's interest rate environment, CEFs find themselves on the other side of the money trade that is negatively impacting banks today. The abnormally low interest rate environment is driving down bank returns to the benefit of strong borrowers like Nuveen. In *Finding Bargains from the Bottom Up,* written in April 1995, our dear friend and firm mentor, Marty Whitman, underscored why CEFs' borrowing costs are a real asset noting, "Another extremely important source of corporate wealth creation is access to outside capital on an ultra-attractive price basis."

If warranted, CEFs can reduce leverage as it becomes less economic because the structure is highly flexible. However, if the underlying bonds in a portfolio are falling quickly in price, as was the case in 2008 and 2009, CEFs can be forced sellers (into a weak market) as they must sell bonds to remain compliant with 1940 Act leverage restrictions. This dynamic is the most troublesome one when investing in leveraged CEFs. RAM mitigates this risk by identifying CEFs not fully leveraged, and holding adequate levels of portfolio liquidity, which can thus withstand market price weakness without necessitating portfolio liquidations. This is also a key reason why CEFs can borrow at cheap short-term rates without being overly concerned about credit lines being pulled. To wit, because of the '40 Act leverage limits, lenders are perennially assured that their loans are covered by 3 to 1 asset coverage (2 to 1 in instances of preferred share leverage). In fact, throughout the financial crisis Nuveen did not have any bank credit facilities pulled.

The pedestrian CEF's other attractive feature when compared to other public finance vehicles lies in fees. In effect, whether it be a bank, a BDC, a mortgage REIT or a CEF, each entity owns a basket of bonds and/or loans, with a certain amount of leverage, and within a certain operating cost structure which results in a return on equity to common shareholders. To wit, management fees at CEFs as compared to many public finance vehicles are a bargain. Publicly traded BDCs seem to be all the rage these days and are in fact performing an important function providing capital to middle market companies once robustly served by the banking industry. However, fees (normal management ones and incentive fees), need to be reviewed closely. To be clear, BDCs do offer some potential advantages to CEFs. First, historically they don't trade at a discount to NAV, although they are currently. Second, they're able to structure their credits themselves and write-in attractive covenants that are often not available in publicly traded bonds and/or loans. Nonetheless, fees need to be analyzed closely given that all of these entities are living off of spread income.

For example, MVC Capital, MVC, a NYSE-traded BDC, last year reported operating expenses (excluding interest expenses on borrowed money), as a percentage of net assets of roughly 3.4%. Nuveen's Global Income High Yield Fund, JGH, discussed below, reported total operating expenses of 1.68% 2015. The two vehicles both have net assets of roughly $300 million and are similarly leveraged. Moreover, MVC pays 7.25% on its borrowings (7-year note) versus JGH's current 1.25% noted above. The popular mortgage REIT, Anworth Mortgage Asset Corporation (ANH), with a market capitalization of roughly $500 million, has averaged operating expenses of 2.2% over the past two years. Further, this past December ANH raised capital at rates ranging from 6.5% to 8.625%. ANH's model necessitates high leverage and it doesn't disappoint at a ratio of roughly 10 to 1, albeit focusing on low-risk agency backed mortgages while mixing in risker non-agency paper.

While banks, and many mortgage REITS, overwhelming hold high grade loans with default rates significantly below high yield bonds and/or loans, they also possess significantly more leverage. To wit, if a bank is leveraged at a typical ratio of $10 of loans for every $1 of equity capital, it only takes 3% of defaults with zero recovery to reduce the value of the equity by 30% (less the earnings from the performing loans). On the other hand, a well-diversified CEF portfolio of high yield bonds, with a leverage ratio of 1.5x, would have to experience a default rate of 20% with zero recovery to similarly reduce the value of its equity by 30%. What's riskier—the credit profile risk in the high yield CEF or the leverage risk in the bank and/or highly leveraged finance vehicle? Certainly the earnings power right now for a HY moderately leveraged bond CEF is far greater than a typical bank with a current ROE of nearly 2x.

In fact, RAM briefly owned Comerica Inc. (CMA) during the quarter (it was a top three purchase in the quarter, but was sold), relying on a traditional value metric of purchasing it at 1x tangible book value. Thinking deeply about the investment, particularly in light of what we accomplished in our bond CEF

investments purchased in the quarter, suggested to us the discount to value was not sufficient in the bank investment. CMA's return on equity (ROE), now about 6% on stated book value, is roughly 6.5% to someone purchasing at tangible book as we did. To be sure, the 6% ROE will climb when interest rates rise. However, such an investment becomes analogous to a growth investment, in this case, highly dependent on the growth driver of rising interest rates, the direction of which we know zilch.

Moreover, banks are facing rising compliance costs that effectively reduce going-forward ROEs for the sector. On the positive side, this lower ROE environment may in fact lead to more consolidation. To be clear, big bank investing today like CMA provides investment optionality on rising interest rates and industry consolidation. However, our CEF investments present a meaningful discount to par *today* to a diversified basket of bonds plus a very attractive *current* income stream. What exists today (RAM's focus), justifies the investment; not what may be tomorrow.

Further, from the perspective of an equity investor, these funds in no way short change investors given the prices we paid in the first quarter. In fact, the returns expected on the two funds we purchased significantly exceed any long-term equity return. It's also worth highlighting that the return associated with our CEF purchases is driven by *contractual obligations* not the whims of what *multiples* the market chooses to assign to a company's earnings and/or asset values at a moment in time. As for the asset class itself, absent the additional attractive CEF dynamics articulated above and aside from the particular prices we paid, it has performed well over time. The WSJ recently reported that from 1983 through the end of 2015, the 8.8% annualized return of an index of high-yield bonds captured 80% of the gain of the S&P 500 stock index with about half the volatility of the stock index.

The CEFs discussed below were purchased at effective double discounts in January during a market swoon. We quickly and opportunistically deployed over 5% of firm capital to these funds. In fact, the 15% discounts to NAV that briefly appeared in January were the widest discounts in over ten years with the exception of 2009. Finally, Nuveen remains an active issuer of IPO closed-end funds and uses steady open-market share purchases and episodic NAV buy-backs to keep its new issuance business robust to the benefit of its current CEF shareholders.

Top Three Purchases

Nuveen Global High Yield Fund, JGH. The fund uses a diversified global high-income strategy, which blends high-yield bonds and other income producing securities from around the world, and across the capital structure and credit spectrum. Currently, 80% of the portfolio is invested in U.S. and other developed market high yield bonds.

JGH was purchased at a 15% discount to its NAV, and its NAV reflected an average market price of 85 on the underlying bonds in the portfolio. The fund has a modest leverage ratio of 1.4x. JGH is widely diversified with the top ten positions accounting for a mere 6% of fund assets. Only one holding exceeds a 1% weighting. In our 2015 4th Quarter letter we indicated our desire to find potential investments in the energy sector that provided a margin of safety and not overly dependent on an energy price recovery. JGH's energy holdings provide a moderate amount—17% of NAV—of exposure to the significantly depressed energy high yield market. At our purchase price the math on a take-private basis is highly attractive as illustrated below. However, in reality, we cannot take JGH private. JGH will likely trade at a normalized CEF discount of 8% discount over time (since 2005 CEFs have traded at an average discount of closer to 5%).

Shares 23.2 million @ $12.50/share = $290 million ($12.50 represents a 15% discount to NAV)
Average Price (% of Par): 85

Total Portfolio Par Value: $605 million
Less Default Loss @ 10% (with 0% recovery): $545 million of remaining par value
Less Debt: $150 million
Equals $395 million, or a 36% premium to market cap (at our purchase price) of $290 million;
Equals $363 million after applying a go-forward discount to NAV of 8%.
Capital Appreciation Assuming 8% discount to NAV = 25%
Current Dividend (currently covered at 106%) - $1.58/share = 12.7%

Additional Fund Facts (as of 1/29/16):
% of Fund Trading at 90 and above: 60%
% of Fund Trading Above Par: 26%
% of Fund Trading below 75: 16%
% of Fund NAV exposed to Energy: 17%

Nuveen Credit Strategies Income Fund, JQC. The fund invests at least 70% of its managed assets in adjustable rate senior secured and second lien loans, and up to 30% opportunistically in other types of securities across a company's capital structure, primarily income-oriented securities such as high yield debt, convertible securities and other forms of corporate debt. JQC is somewhat hedged against rising rates given its focus on adjustable rate loans.

JQC was purchased at a 15% discount to NAV, and its NAV reflected an average price of 85 on the underlying loans in the portfolio. The fund has a moderate leverage ratio of 1.6x. The fund is widely diversified, although not nearly to the extent of JGH given that the fund's loans are much higher up in corporate capital structures thus reducing the need for enhanced diversification. The top ten holdings account for 21% of the total portfolio assets. JQC has virtually no exposure to energy bonds at only 0.8% of NAV.

Shares: 135.8 million @ $7.50/share = $1.019 billion ($7.50 represents a 15% discount to NAV)
Average Price (% of Par): 85
Total Portfolio Par Value: $2.265 billion
Less Default Loss @ 5% (with 0% recovery): $2.151 billion
Less Debt: $706 million
Equals $1.445 billion, or a 42% premium to market cap (at our purchase price) of $1.019 billion;
Equals $1.329 billion after applying a go-forward discount to NAV of 8%.
Capital Appreciation Assuming 8% discount to NAV = 30%
Current Dividend (current coverage is 97%) - $0.62/share = 8.2%

Additional Fund Facts (as of 1/29/16):
% of Fund Trading at 90 and above: 76%
% of Fund Trading Above Par: 8%
% of Fund Trading below 75: 7%
% of Fund NAV exposed to Energy: 0.8%

Comerica Inc., CMA. As noted above this position was sold in the same quarter it was purchased.

We will continue to methodically and diligently search for out-of-favor, overlooked and misunderstood investments and stay true to being balance sheet focused, opportunistic, and thoughtful while gathering enough information to make well-informed investment decisions.

Disclosure: The specific securities identified and described do not represent all of the securities purchased, sold, or recommended for advisory clients, and the reader should not assume that investments in the securities identified and discussed were or will be profitable. The top three securities purchased in the quarter are based on the largest absolute dollar purchases made in the quarter.

Roumell Asset Management, LLC
Balanced Composite
Annual Disclosure Presentation

		Composite Assets		Annual Performance Results			3-Yr Annualized Standard Deviation	
Year End	Total Firm Assets (Millions)	USD (Millions)	Number of Accounts	Composite Net	Thomson US Balanced Mutual Fund	Composite Dispersion	Composite Net Standard Deviation	Thomson US BL MF Standard Deviation
2015	94	12	37	-11.35%	-1.71%	4.41%	7.32%	6.56%
2014	170	49	93	-7.71%	6.00%	4.25%	6.23%	6.08%
2013	288	82	140	11.85%	15.73%	5.69%	6.62%	8.06%
2012	286	82	156	10.50%	11.71%	3.02%	6.50%	9.79%
2011	306	79	173	-5.19%	0.53%	4.28%		
2010	311	83	167	12.25%	11.75%	2.59%		
2009	249	55	124	33.19%	23.19%	5.79%		
2008	166	40	121	-22.82%	-26.97%	5.01%		
2007	270	75	154	-7.58%	5.76%	3.71%		
2006	280	87	158	14.00%	10.47%	3.69%		
2005	199	73	142	8.56%	4.22%	2.67%		
2004	123	66	119	16.48%	7.79%	3.82%		
2003	66	42	100	28.26%	18.60%	3.94%		
2002	41	27	79	-9.70%	-11.36%	3.77%		
2001	31	17	39	21.18%	-4.19%	4.75%		
2000	19	10	23	8.47%	1.95%	4.53%		
1999	16	9	22	12.53%	8.35%	2.63%		

Balanced Composite contains fully discretionary accounts. Roumell Asset Management, LLC (Roumell) is an opportunistic capital allocator with a deep value bias. On average, Balanced accounts have a target of 65% equity (provided an appropriate number of securities are found that meet Roumell's deep value investment criteria), with the remaining 35% in fixed income and cash. The equity allocation is all cap with a focus on smaller companies. In selecting bond investments, Roumell exercises its value discipline and buys only fixed income securities that it believes represent value on a risk-adjusted basis. It may buy individual government agency, investment grade and high-yield corporate, municipal, and foreign bonds and closed-end bond funds. When fully invested, accounts will hold about 25 to 30 positions. Roumell will hold cash in the absence of sufficient investment opportunities. For comparison purposes, the Balanced Composite is measured against the Thomson US Balanced Mutual Fund Index. In presentations shown prior to March 31, 2006, the composite was also compared against the Lipper Balanced Index. Additionally, in presentations prior to December 2006, the composite was measured against the Vanguard Balanced Index Fund. The Thomson US Balanced Mutual Fund Index is a blend of more than 500 balanced mutual funds and is therefore deemed to more accurately reflect the strategy of the composite. The Balanced Composite was created January 1, 1999.

Roumell Asset Management, LLC claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) and has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS standards. Roumell Asset Management, LLC has been independently verified by Ashland Partners & Company LLP for the periods January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2015. Verification assesses whether (1) the firm has complied with all the composite construction requirements of the GIPS standards on a firm-wide basis and (2) the firm's policies and procedures are designed to calculate and present performance in compliance with the GIPS standards. The Balanced Composite has been examined by Ashland Partners & Company LLP for the periods January 1, 1999 through December 31, 2015. The verification and performance examination reports are available upon request.

Roumell Asset Management, LLC is an independent registered investment adviser. The firm maintains a complete list and description of composites, which is available upon request. Results are based on fully discretionary accounts under management, including those accounts no longer with the firm. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

The U.S. dollar is the currency used to express performance. Returns are presented net of management fees and include the reinvestment of all income. Net of fee performance was calculated using actual management fees. From 2010 to 2013, for certain of these accounts, net returns have been reduced by a performance-based fee of 20% of profits, paid annually in the first quarter. Net returns are reduced by all fees and transaction costs incurred. Wrap fee accounts pay a fee based on a percentage of assets under management. Other than brokerage commissions, this fee includes investment management, portfolio monitoring, consulting services, and in some cases, custodial services. Prior to and post 2006, there were no wrap fee accounts in the composite. For the year ended December 31, 2006, wrap fee accounts made up less than 1% of the composite. Wrap fee schedules are provided by independent wrap sponsors and are available upon request from the respective wrap sponsor. Returns include the effect of foreign currency exchange rates. Exchange rate source utilized by the portfolios within the composite may vary. Composite performance is presented net of foreign withholding taxes. Withholding taxes may vary according to the investor's domicile.

The annual composite dispersion presented is an asset-weighted standard deviation calculated for the accounts in the composite for the entire year. Dispersion calculations are greater as a result of managing accounts on a client relationship basis. Securities are bought based on the combined value of all portfolios of a client relationship and then allocated to one account within a client relationship. Therefore, accounts within a client relationship will hold different securities. The result is greater dispersion amongst accounts. The 3-year annualized ex-post standard deviation of the composite and/or benchmark is not presented for the period prior to December 31, 2012, because 36 monthly returns are not available. Policies for valuing portfolios, calculating performance, and preparing compliant presentations are available upon request.

The investment management fee schedule for the composite is as follows: for Direct Portfolio Management Services: 1.30% on the first $1,000,000, and 1.00% on assets over $1,000,000; for Sub-Adviser Services: determined by adviser; for Wrap Fee Services: determined by sponsor. Actual investment advisory fees incurred by clients may vary.

Roumell Asset Management, LLC
Opportunistic Value Composite
Annual Disclosure Presentation

	COMPOSITE ASSETS			ANNUAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS					3-YR ANNUALIZED STANDARD DEVIATION			
YEAR END	TOTAL FIRM ASSETS (MILLIONS)	USD (MILLIONS)	NUMBER OF ACCOUNTS	COMPOSITE NET	60% RUSSELL 2000 VALUE/ 40% BARCLAYS US GOVT CREDIT	S&P 500	RUSSELL 2000 VALUE	COMPOSITE DISPERSION	COMPOSITE NET STD DEV	60% RUSSELL 2000 VALUE/ 40% BARCLAYS US GOVT CREDIT STD DEV	S&P 500 STD DEV	RUSSELL 2000 VALUE STD DEV
2015	94	23	77	-15.27%	-4.26%	1.38%	-7.46%	2.80%	9.23%	8.12%	10.47%	13.46%
2014	170	61	163	-10.74%	5.18%	13.70%	4.22%	3.41%	7.97%	7.71%	8.97%	12.79%
2013	288	130	281	12.83%	18.61%	32.38%	34.51%	3.12%	8.90%	9.16%	11.94%	15.82%
2012	286	157	367	13.92%	12.82%	16.00%	18.05%	1.86%	8.63%	11.36%	15.09%	19.89%
2011	306	175	466	-9.51%	0.59%	2.11%	-5.49%	2.17%				
2010	311	189	479	14.71%	17.97%	15.06%	24.49%	2.17%				
2009	249	153	414	42.19%	15.13%	26.47%	20.57%	5.57%				
2008	166	104	413	-27.35%	-15.77%	-36.99%	-28.93%	3.40%				
2007	270	178	549	-7.67%	-3.05%	5.49%	-9.78%	2.68%				
2006	280	176	458	16.89%	15.40%	15.79%	23.48%	2.18%				
2005	199	111	312	12.38%	4.00%	4.91%	4.71%	2.59%				
2004	123	47	125	20.18%	14.92%	10.88%	22.25%	2.69%				
2003	66	15	46	32.13%	28.38%	28.69%	46.03%	4.04%				
2002	41	8	44	-10.15%	-2.31%	-22.10%	-11.43%	4.33%				
2001	31	5	30	32.76%	12.26%	-11.89%	14.02%	6.33%				
2000	19	2	12	7.97%	18.50%	-9.10%	22.83%	4.05%				
1999	16	2	9	26.02%	-1.54%	21.04%	-1.49%	3.92%				

Opportunistic Value Composite contains fully discretionary accounts. Roumell Asset Management, LLC (Roumell) is an opportunistic capital allocator with a deep value bias. Opportunistic Value accounts can have up to 100% of their assets invested in stocks in the ideal situation where an appropriate number of securities are found that meet Roumell's deep value investment criteria. Historically, these accounts have emphasized common stocks (all cap with a focus on smaller companies). However, Roumell will also selectively purchase a mixture of high yield bonds and discounted closed-end bond funds if it is believed that these offer a favorable risk/reward profile. When fully invested, accounts will hold about 25 to 30 positions. Roumell will hold cash in the absence of sufficient investment opportunities. For comparison purposes, the Opportunistic Value Composite is measured against the S&P 500, a blend of 60% Russell 2000 Value and 40% Barclays U.S. Government Credit (calculated on a monthly basis), and Russell 2000 Value Indices. Presentations provided prior to January 1, 2014, showed the Russell 2000 in place of the blended index. The change was made to better reflect the opportunistic strategy of the composite. As noted before, the composite's allocation to equity, fixed income, and cash will vary depending on Roumell's investment decisions. The S&P 500 Index is used for comparative purposes only and is not meant to be indicative of the Opportunistic Value Composite's performance. In presentations shown prior to March 31, 2005, the composite was also compared against the Nasdaq Index. The benchmark was eliminated since it did not represent the strategy of the composite. The Opportunistic Value Composite was created January 1, 1999. Prior to January 1, 2014, this composite was known as the Total Return Composite.

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Roumell Asset Management, LLC is an independent registered investment adviser. The firm maintains a complete list and description of composites, which is available upon request. Results are based on fully discretionary accounts under management, including those accounts no longer with the firm. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

The U.S. dollar is the currency used to express performance. Returns are presented net of management fees and include the reinvestment of all income. Net of fee performance was calculated using actual management fees. Net returns are reduced by all fees and transaction costs incurred. Wrap fee accounts pay a fee based on a percentage of assets under management. Other than brokerage commissions, this fee includes investment management, portfolio monitoring, consulting services, and in some cases, custodial services. Wrap accounts are included in the composite. As of December 31 of each year 2006 through 2015, wrap fee accounts made up 33%, 36%, 31%, 33%, 41%, 40%, 41%, 43%, 31% and 13% of the composite, respectively. Wrap fee schedules are provided by independent wrap sponsors and are available upon request from the respective wrap sponsor. Returns include the effect of foreign currency exchange rates. Exchange rate source utilized by the portfolios within the composite may vary. Composite performance is presented net of foreign withholding taxes. Withholding taxes may vary according to the investor's domicile.

The annual composite dispersion presented is an asset-weighted standard deviation calculated for the accounts in the composite for the entire year. Dispersion calculations are greater as a result of managing accounts on a client relationship basis. Securities are bought based on the combined value of all portfolios of a client relationship and then allocated to one account within a client relationship. Therefore, accounts within a client relationship will hold different securities. The result is greater dispersion amongst accounts. The 3-year annualized ex-post standard deviation of the composite and/or benchmark is not presented for the period prior to December 31, 2012, because 36 monthly returns are not available. Policies for valuing portfolios, calculating performance, and preparing compliant presentations are available upon request.

The investment management fee schedule for the composite is as follows: for Direct Portfolio Management Services: 1.30% on the first $1,000,000, and 1.00% on assets over $1,000,000; for Sub-Adviser Services: determined by adviser; for Wrap Fee Services: determined by sponsor. Actual investment advisory fees incurred by clients may vary.