

Quarterly Report

January 31, 2013

Roumell Asset Management, LLC

Fourth Quarter Summary

Performance Summary

	ANNUALIZED AS OF 12/31/12					TOTAL RETURN	
	4Q 2012	1 YEAR	3 YEAR	5 YEAR	10 YEAR	SINCE INCEPTION*	SINCE INCEPTION*
Roumell Equity (Net)	5.34%	13.92%	5.75%	4.08%	8.93%	10.04%	281.80%
S&P 500	-0.38%	16.00%	10.87%	1.66%	7.10%	2.94%	49.98%
Russell 2000	1.85%	16.35%	12.24%	3.55%	9.71%	6.52%	142.19%
Russell 2000 Value	3.22%	18.05%	11.57%	3.54%	9.50%	8.24%	202.87%
Roumell Balanced (Net)	3.88%	10.50%	5.55%	3.87%	7.53%	7.52%	175.94%
Thomson US Bal Index	1.03%	11.71%	7.87%	2.46%	5.80%	3.63%	64.85%
Roumell Fixed Income (Net)	0.94%	6.61%	5.75%	N/A	N/A	13.04%	63.26%
Barclays US Aggregate Bond	0.22%	4.23%	6.19%	N/A	N/A	6.13%	26.86%
Barclays US Corp Hi Yield	3.29%	15.82%	11.87%	N/A	N/A	22.00%	121.51%

*Inception of Roumell Equity and Roumell Balanced is 1/1/99. Inception of Roumell Fixed Income is 1/1/09.

Roumell Asset Management, LLC claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®). Ashland Partners & Co. LLP, our independent verifier, completed its examination of the composite performance returns for the period of 1999 (inception) through September 30, 2012. All returns include reinvested dividends and interest. Please refer to the annual disclosure presentations at the end of this letter.

We are satisfied with our 2012 performance. As the year wound down, several of our investment theses began to play out and that trend has continued into the new year. As we have long argued, our portfolio is a mix of highly company-specific investment narratives and is not designed to provide simple market exposure. If we are correct in our core analysis, intrinsic value will ultimately be unlocked, albeit not in a manner we can time. Our 2012 performance was attained with about 51%, 26%, and 23% exposure to equities, corporate bonds, and cash, respectively.

The Commoditization of Information

Information is now available everywhere, on demand, and requires little effort to find. We can all click Wikipedia and quickly become “experts” on any number of individuals, historical events, and dates of infamy. Yet up until recently, one had to expend considerable effort researching and reading to become knowledgeable about wars, macroeconomic theory, or to answer the countless intriguing questions pursued by inquiring minds.

Recently, Harvard and MIT announced a new nonprofit joint venture, known as edX, which will offer free online courses. In fact, free massive open online courses, or MOOCs, are just getting started. The commoditization of information is sure to rise. Coursera is an emerging platform that partners with major universities with the goal of providing free online courses and has signed up Stanford and

Princeton, among others. The Khan Academy offers over 3,800 brief, substantive videos. The opportunity to become conversant in any number of topics is quite remarkable.

As it pertains to an investment enterprise, if content is just a click away and information so readily available, what begins to distinguish investors? Thinking, patience, a relentless research process, and character all come to mind. These human attributes will never become commodities. The ability to think well, to reason, and to remain patient is a chief determinant of investment success, and it will always be. Data may be ubiquitous, but sound reasoning and judgment will never lend themselves to internet packaging, nor will the emotional intelligence that builds over time from careful and persistent reflection on experience. The internet will quickly inform one about the general outline of Plato's life, but will provide nothing in helping an individual answer the questions posed in his dialogues: What are justice, beauty, and the good? How should I live my life? We are left to reason and reflect, provided we can sit quietly long enough to think about such questions.

In the recently published book *The Value Investors*, author Ronald W. Chan offers insight into the various investment processes of such investment luminaries as Walter Schloss, Irving and Thomas Kahn, William Browne, and Teng Ngiek Lian. A number of words come up repeatedly throughout these interesting interviews: humility, patience, caution, process, discipline, and courage. The book is absent of models, trading schemes, and the like. There is scant information per se; there is simply a reflection on investment process and the requisite temperamental qualities necessary to carry out sustainable, duplicable investment success. Thomas Kahn well captures our own thinking in stating, "Value investing is essentially a contrarian approach. It involves buying something that is currently unpopular and waiting for it to become popular again. It's like buying...a heater in the summer and an air-conditioner in the winter."

The bottom line from this eclectic group of investors: you'd better work hard, be steadfast, and remain cheerful in the practice of your discipline. The good news is that a well-reasoned approach, practiced with humility and caution, has high odds of success with the added ingredient of patience. In fact, William Browne highlights a study the Tweedy, Browne Company did some years ago, "10 Ways to Beat an Index," which presents empirical evidence that shows that "80 to 90 percent of investment returns have occurred in spurts that amount to 2 to 7 percent of the total length of the holding period. The rest of the time, stocks' returns have been small." In our own case, over half of our 14-year since-inception Equity return of 282% was generated from each year's best quarter.

As much as information has become easier to access, we still believe firmly that this information is uneven in quality and does not replace old-fashioned shoe leather work. In our minds, the investment culture has been taken in by the notion that everything can be learned while sitting at one's desk searching the internet. Deeper understanding often demands direct experience. Our research process is relentless and includes regular travel to see management teams, assets, customers, and competitors firsthand in order to obtain more and better information.

The "higher things" in life (thinking, feeling, temperament, and patience) will never become commodities. The investment operation flows from a clear, well-defined philosophy with the discipline to forge ahead independent of the market's current vote of confidence—and that's finally about a firm's character. Proverbs perhaps says it best, "Where there is no vision, the people will perish." In turn, if there is no investment vision, the strategy will, at some point, fail. The investor must internalize his or her process and beliefs such that they become part of his or her being. The mind's eye ultimately becomes the tool to distinguish between risk and reward.

Our Portfolio: Well-Capitalized Special Situation Equities, Select Higher Yielding Bonds, and Cash

Our investment vision is to find value through out-of-favor, overlooked, or misunderstood securities and to do it on a highly opportunistic basis. Our portfolio is best suited for price-conscious investors who are more interested in the price versus value relationship than concerned over short-term volatility, and are willing to sit patiently in cash in the absence of compelling investment ideas. Equity holdings in our portfolio are cheaper than the overall market based on various metrics, including price/book and price/sales. Many of our holdings are ignored by Wall Street, allowing our intensive research discipline to gain us an informational or analytical edge. **The portfolio's equity holdings are characterized by strong balance sheets (typically net cash positions) and unique assets.** Our portfolio also includes a weighting in high yield bonds, as well as a healthy cash balance. All of these portfolio attributes reduce risk relative to the overall market, and are even more important given the current realities of continued consumer and government deleveraging, as well as anemic economic growth. Recently, the World Bank reduced its 2013 estimates for global growth from 3% to 2.4%, and also cut its 2013 estimate for the 17-nation euro area growth from 1.1% to -0.1%. In addition to the weak macroeconomic backdrop, lower portfolio risk is also important because the stock market is not particularly cheap based on a 10-year cyclically adjusted P/E, replacement value, or market capitalization to GDP basis.

All of our companies are ones we would "take private" in a heartbeat, which is our primary animating principle in selecting securities. In our view, an additional tailwind will be provided by an increase in mergers and acquisitions, given that organic growth is more challenging to achieve in a slow economy. In a recent Ernst & Young survey, 81% of companies indicating that they plan on making an acquisition during the next year say they will be looking at deals for \$500 million or less, a market segment that we favor. Additionally, it is estimated that private equity firms are flush with over \$550 billion in cash earmarked for buyouts. Recently, one of our top 10 equity positions received a buyout offer and another holding is in the news rumored as the target of the largest private equity buyout since 2007.

Among our bond holdings, we are weighted toward small exploration and production energy companies possessing strong reserves of out-of-favor commodities such as natural gas. Our bonds are most often supported by hard assets (typically energy or real estate assets), which can easily be isolated and sold, if necessary, to improve liquidity and protect the principal value of our investments. In time, we believe low natural gas prices will self-correct because production has shifted to higher value oil, which is trading at more than 25 times the price of natural gas but contains only 5.825 times more energy.

Finally, our large cash position provides a significant hedge and opportunistic dry powder, given an overall U.S. stock market valuation that only appears cheap because corporate profit margins are the highest in 60 years.

This quarter's top three purchases (discussed next) well represent the flexibility of our investment mandate to opportunistically pursue value wherever we might find it and include a mega-cap company with a worldwide brand, a corporate bond ultimately supported by real estate, and a small-cap company.

We are pleased to announce that Jason Mackey has joined our team as a trader. Prior to joining Roumell Asset Management in September 2012, Jason was the primary trader for Hovde Capital Advisors, a long-short equity hedge fund. He also worked as a senior trader for Rydex Investments, handling trades for the firm's Index, Sector, and Alternative funds in addition to ETFs. Jason holds a BS in business management from Ithaca College.

Top Three Purchases

Apple Inc., AAPL. Several months ago, sell-side analysts fought over who was going to have the highest price target for Apple. Now, in similar lockstep, the analysts are trying to avoid being the last one to reduce Apple earnings estimates and price targets. Have Apple's core attributes of innovation and a maniacal focus on the customer experience changed? We think not. Apple generates 40% returns on equity, has an entrenched franchise, and grows earnings at double-digit rates, yet trades for only 10x earnings, or 8x excluding its net cash holdings. In other words, we have the opportunity to own one of the best growth companies in the world, and we can do it by paying less than 80% of the stock market multiple. Opportunities like this are rare.

Apple has a roughly 30% and 20% share of the U.S. and global smartphone markets, respectively. In the third quarter of 2012 (latest figures available), the global mobile phone market grew 2%, but the smartphone market grew 45%! There are five billion "dumb phones" worldwide that in time will all be replaced with smartphones. Apple has some very strong wind at its back.

Apple's scale creates a tremendous advantage. The company will spend about \$13 billion this year on capital and R&D expenditures. That's a big number on an absolute basis, but an even bigger one considering that Apple essentially only has four products: iPhone, iPad, iPod, and Mac. Another advantage of scale is Apple's consistent strategy to fill industry capacity of various components well in advance, thereby blocking competitors' ability to manufacture in the same timely manner. Apple currently has \$21 billion of outstanding off-balance-sheet third-party manufacturing commitments and component purchase commitments.

Apple has roughly 200 million customers, and they are by and large cultish, fanatical customers at that. Its customer base is yet another competitive advantage in terms of new product launches. Late Apple CEO and cofounder Steve Jobs stated that he wanted to develop a television that integrates seamlessly with other Apple devices. If Apple launches a TV, we don't think its 200 million customers will be buying Samsung or Sony TVs.

The stock has declined about 25% over the last several months for two primary reasons. Since the death of Steve Jobs in October 2011, the market has been skeptical that current CEO Tim Cook could lead as effectively. Investors' fears seemed validated upon Apple's launch of the iPhone 5 in the fall of 2012, in which the company replaced Google Maps with a homegrown version in its upgraded iOS 6 software. Apple's new maps software had glitches and did not live up to expectations. Cook has responded with a management shake-up, and the company has made available a Google Maps app. Another concern is that roughly 60% of Apple's earnings come from the iPhone, and margins could decline as the company competes with lower end competitive products. The bottom line is that these concerns do not justify an 8x multiple in the stock, especially considering the growth in the smartphone market and Apple's balance sheet strength. We believe Apple is one of the great opportunities being offered in the stock market today.

JC Penney Company, Inc. 5.65% 6/1/20 Bonds. We initiated a position in the 2020 issue of JC Penney (JCP) bonds at an average price of \$84.12, for a yield to maturity of 8.55%. JC Penney is in the midst of a transformation under the leadership of Ron Johnson, who built Apple's retail stores and was chief merchandising officer at Target earlier in his career. Bill Ackman's Pershing Square Capital Management and Steve Roth's Vornado Realty Trust own 18% and 11%, respectively, of JCP stock. Ackman is a successful activist investor, and Roth is a savvy real estate investor. Both men, as well as Johnson, are on JC Penney's board.

In the five years prior to Johnson's arrival, JCP generated an average of \$1.75 billion of EBITDA. Net debt of \$2.4 billion is only 1.4x average EBITDA. With the investment and leadership of three luminaries in their respective industries (retail, investing, and real estate), we believe JC Penney's EBITDA will likely improve over time from the \$1.75 billion level.

Johnson is remaking JC Penney into a mall within a mall. More than 100 brands have indicated interest in opening up shops within JC Penney stores. Brands include Levi's, Izod, Sephora, Liz Claiborne, Carter's, Giggie, Disney, Nike, Jonathan Adler, Michael Graves, Puma, Vivienne Tam, Martha Stewart, and Vanity Fair. For the 11% of JCP's square footage that has been transformed to date, the average sales per square foot have doubled in comparison to the old format. There's plenty of fat to cut on the expense side as well. One example is that the company has 15% more employees per store than its competitors.

Finally, JC Penney owns 39% of its real estate. Based on the company's rent expense, a 7% cap rate implies a value of \$2.8 billion for its owned real estate, itself a 15% premium to the company's net debt. It seems a reasonable assumption that Steve Roth would not be involved if he did not view the real estate as being valuable.

There is some concern in the market that JC Penney will turn out to be another Sears, the stock of which has declined by half since Edward Lampert acquired the company (through Kmart) in late 2004. But JC Penney has been investing three times more than Sears as a percentage of sales to improve its stores, and this year JC Penney will invest six times more than Sears. Secondly, Ron Johnson is a retailer; Lampert is not. Lastly, we chose to invest in the debt instead of the equity because we view the debt as the better risk/reward security, in part because the debt is far less dependent on a successful JC Penney turnaround than is the equity. Summing all of the above, we believe our bonds are well covered, and that an 8.5% return is attractive in the context of both current cash yields and historical stock market returns.

Tetra Technologies, Inc., TTI. In the fourth quarter, we again added to Tetra Technologies, an oil and gas services company. As we noted in our third quarter letter, the stock sold off dramatically following the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil rig explosion, which triggered the federal government to impose a drilling moratorium in the Gulf. Although the drilling moratorium had a negative impact on Tetra's well decommissioning business, we viewed the effects of the moratorium as temporary, and thus a great opportunity to make a bargain investment in a well-managed energy company.

In 2011, TTI spun out Compressco (GSJK) into a separate, publicly traded company. Compressco is in the niche business of production-enhancement services, squeezing more life out of wells that are nearing the end of their productivity. The value of this service is greater in the new day of shale wells, which decline much more rapidly than traditional wells and thus will require compression services sooner. Backing out TTI's retained 83% ownership of Compressco, TTI is trading for just 4x EBITDA, even after the nearly 40% rally in the stock since the end of the third quarter. As further validation of our views, a number of TTI executives and directors bought stock in the open market in the third and fourth quarters. We believe the stock remains a great value.

Stuart Brightman, Tetra's CEO, is scheduled to present at our investor day on October 8, 2013, at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, DC.

Disclosure: The specific securities identified and described do not represent all of the securities purchased, sold, or recommended for advisory clients, and the reader should not assume that investments in the securities identified and discussed were or will be profitable. The top three securities purchased in the quarter are based on the largest absolute dollar purchases made in the quarter.

Roumell Asset Management, LLC
Balanced Composite
Annual Disclosure Presentation

YEAR END	COMPOSITE ASSETS			ANNUAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS			3-YR ANNUALIZED STANDARD DEVIATION	
	TOTAL FIRM ASSETS (MILLIONS)	USD (MILLIONS)	NUMBER OF ACCOUNTS	COMPOSITE NET	THOMSON US BALANCED MUTUAL FUND	COMPOSITE DISPERSION	COMPOSITE NET STANDARD DEVIATION	THOMPSON US BL MF STANDARD DEVIATION
2012	286	82	156	10.50%	11.71%	3.02%	6.50%	9.79%
2011	306	79	173	-5.19%	0.53%	4.28%		
2010	311	83	167	12.25%	11.75%	2.59%		
2009	249	55	124	33.19%	23.19%	5.79%		
2008	166	40	121	-22.82%	-26.97%	5.01%		
2007	270	75	154	-7.58%	5.76%	3.71%		
2006	280	87	158	14.00%	10.47%	3.69%		
2005	199	73	142	8.56%	4.22%	2.67%		
2004	123	66	119	16.48%	7.79%	3.82%		
2003	66	42	100	28.26%	18.60%	3.94%		
2002	41	27	79	-9.70%	-11.36%	3.77%		
2001	31	17	39	21.18%	-4.19%	4.75%		
2000	19	10	23	8.47%	1.95%	4.53%		
1999	16	9	22	12.53%	8.35%	2.63%		

Balanced Composite contains fully discretionary balanced accounts (consisting of equity, fixed income, and cash investments). Roumell Asset Management, LLC (Roumell) is an opportunistic capital allocator with a deep value bias. On average, Balanced accounts have a target of 65% equity (provided an appropriate number of securities are found that meet Roumell's deep value investment criteria), with the remaining 35% in fixed income and cash. The equity allocation is all cap with a focus on smaller companies. In selecting bond investments, Roumell exercises its value discipline and buys only fixed income securities that it believes represent value on a risk-adjusted basis. It may buy individual government agency, investment grade and high-yield corporate, municipal, and foreign bonds and closed-end bond funds. When fully invested, accounts will hold about 25 to 30 positions. Roumell will hold cash in the absence of sufficient investment opportunities. For comparison purposes, the Balanced Composite is measured against the Thomson US Balanced Mutual Fund Index. In presentations shown prior to March 31, 2006, the composite was also compared against the Lipper Balanced Index. Additionally, in presentations prior to December 2006, the composite was measured against the Vanguard Balanced Index Fund. The Thomson US Balanced Mutual Fund Index is a blend of more than 500 balanced mutual funds and is therefore deemed to more accurately reflect the strategy of the composite. The Balanced Composite was created January 1, 1999.

Roumell Asset Management, LLC claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) and has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS standards. Roumell Asset Management, LLC has been independently verified by Ashland Partners & Company LLP for the periods January 1, 1999 through September 30, 2012. Verification assesses whether (1) the firm has complied with all the composite construction requirements of the GIPS standards on a firm-wide basis and (2) the firm's policies and procedures are designed to calculate and present performance in compliance with the GIPS standards. The Balanced Composite has been examined by Ashland Partners & Company LLP for the periods January 1, 1999 through September 30, 2012. The verification and performance examination reports are available upon request.

Roumell Asset Management, LLC is an independent registered investment adviser. The firm maintains a complete list and description of composites, which is available upon request. Results are based on fully discretionary accounts under management, including those accounts no longer with the firm. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

The U.S. dollar is the currency used to express performance. Returns are presented net of management fees and include the reinvestment of all income. Net of fee performance was calculated using actual management fees. Beginning in 2010, for certain of these accounts, net returns have been reduced by a performance-based fee of 20% of profits, paid annually in the first quarter. Net returns are reduced by all fees and transaction costs incurred. Wrap fee accounts pay a fee based on a percentage of assets under management. Other than brokerage commissions, this fee includes investment management, portfolio monitoring, consulting services, and in some cases, custodial services. Prior to and post 2006, there were no wrap fee accounts in the composite. For the year ended December 31, 2006, wrap fee accounts made up less than 1% of the composite. Wrap fee schedules are provided by independent wrap sponsors and are available upon request from the respective wrap sponsor. Returns include the effect of foreign currency exchange rates. Exchange rate source utilized by the portfolios within the composite may vary. Composite performance is presented net of foreign withholding taxes. Withholding taxes may vary according to the investor's domicile.

The annual composite dispersion presented is an asset-weighted standard deviation calculated for the accounts in the composite for the entire year. Dispersion calculations are greater as a result of managing accounts on a client relationship basis. Securities are bought based on the combined value of all portfolios of a client relationship and then allocated to one account within a client relationship. Therefore, accounts within a client relationship will hold different securities. The result is greater dispersion amongst accounts. The 3-year annualized ex-post standard deviation of the composite and/or benchmark is not presented for the period prior to December 31, 2012 because 36 monthly returns are not available. Policies for valuing portfolios, calculating performance, and preparing compliant presentations are available upon request.

The investment management fee schedule for the composite is as follows: for Direct Portfolio Management Services: 1.75% on the first \$200,000, 1.50% on the next \$300,000, and 1.00% on assets over \$500,000; for Sub-Adviser Services: determined by adviser; for Wrap Fee Services: determined by sponsor. Actual investment advisory fees incurred by clients may vary.

Roumell Asset Management, LLC
Fixed Income Composite
Annual Disclosure Presentation

YEAR END	COMPOSITE ASSETS			ANNUAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS				3-YR ANNUALIZED STANDARD DEVIATION		
	TOTAL FIRM ASSETS (MILLIONS)	USD (MILLIONS)	NUMBER OF ACCOUNTS	COMPOSITE NET	BARCLAYS US AGGREGATE BOND	BARCLAYS US CORP HIGH YIELD	COMPOSITE DISPERSION	COMPOSITE NET STANDARD DEVIATION	BARCLAYS US AGGR BOND STANDARD DEVIATION	BARCLAYS US CORP HIGH YIELD STANDARD DEVIATION
2012	286	2	5	6.61%	4.23%	15.82%	1.46%	2.96%	2.38%	7.08%
2011	306	7	10	1.90%	7.84%	4.98%	1.01%			
2010	311	6	11	8.85%	6.54%	15.15%	1.07%			
2009	249	5	11	38.06%	5.94%	58.21%	N/A			

N/A—Information is not statistically meaningful due to an insufficient number of portfolios in the composite for the entire year.

Fixed Income Composite contains fully discretionary fixed income accounts (consisting of closed-end bond funds, individual bonds, and open-end bond funds). Roumell Asset Management, LLC (Roumell) is an opportunistic capital allocator with a deep value bias. Fixed Income accounts are designed to generate meaningful current income and experience principal appreciation by buying at a discount to stated par value. The focus is to identify attractive high yield, non-investment grade corporate debt and discounted closed-end bond funds. However, accounts will invest in other forms of fixed income securities if the investment opportunity meets Roumell's opportunistic deep value emphasis. For comparison purposes, the Fixed Income Composite is measured against the Barclays Capital US Aggregate Index and Barclays Capital US Corporate High Yield Index. The Fixed Income Composite was created January 1, 2009. Roumell Asset Management, LLC will hold cash in the absence of sufficient investment opportunities.

Roumell Asset Management, LLC claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) and has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS standards. Roumell Asset Management, LLC has been independently verified by Ashland Partners & Company LLP for the periods January 1, 1999 through September 30, 2012. Verification assesses whether (1) the firm has complied with all the composite construction requirements of the GIPS standards on a firm-wide basis and (2) the firm's policies and procedures are designed to calculate and present performance in compliance with the GIPS standards. The Fixed Income Composite has been examined by Ashland Partners & Company LLP for the periods January 1, 2009 through September 30, 2012. The verification and performance examination reports are available upon request.

Roumell Asset Management, LLC is an independent registered investment adviser. The firm maintains a complete list and description of composites, which is available upon request. Results are based on fully discretionary accounts under management, including those accounts no longer with the firm. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

The U.S. dollar is the currency used to express performance. Returns are presented net of management fees and include the reinvestment of all income. Net of fee performance was calculated using actual management fees. For certain of these accounts, net returns have been reduced by a performance-based fee of 20% of profits, paid annually in the first quarter. Net returns are reduced by all fees and transaction costs incurred. Returns include the effect of foreign currency exchange rates. Exchange rate source utilized by the portfolios within the composite may vary. Composite performance is presented net of foreign withholding taxes. Withholding taxes may vary according to the investor's domicile.

The annual composite dispersion presented is an asset-weighted standard deviation calculated for the accounts in the composite for the entire year. Dispersion calculations are greater as a result of managing accounts on a client relationship basis. Securities are bought based on the combined value of all portfolios of a client relationship and then allocated to one account within a client relationship. Therefore, accounts within a client relationship will hold different securities. The result is greater dispersion amongst accounts. The 3-year annualized ex-post standard deviation of the composite and/or benchmark is not presented for the period prior to December 31, 2012 because 36 monthly returns are not available. Policies for valuing portfolios, calculating performance, and preparing compliant presentations are available upon request.

The investment management fee schedule for the composite is as follows: for Direct Portfolio Management Services: 1.00% on all assets; for Sub-Adviser Services: determined by adviser. Actual investment advisory fees incurred by clients may vary.

Roumell Asset Management, LLC

Equity Composite

Annual Disclosure Presentation

YEAR END	COMPOSITE ASSETS			ANNUAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS					3-YR ANNUALIZED STANDARD DEVIATION			
	TOTAL FIRM ASSETS (MILLIONS)	USD (MILLIONS)	NUMBER OF ACCOUNTS	COMPOSITE NET	S&P 500	RUSSELL 2000	RUSSELL 2000 VALUE	COMPOSITE DISPERSION	COMPOSITE NET STANDARD DEVIATION	S&P 500 STANDARD DEVIATION	RUSSELL 2000 STANDARD DEVIATION	RUSSELL 2000 VALUE STANDARD DEVIATION
2012	286	157	367	13.92%	16.00%	16.35%	18.05%	1.86%	8.63%	15.09%	20.20%	19.89%
2011	306	175	466	-9.51%	2.11%	-4.19%	-5.49%	2.17%				
2010	311	189	479	14.71%	15.06%	26.85%	24.49%	2.17%				
2009	249	153	414	42.19%	26.47%	27.18%	20.57%	5.57%				
2008	166	104	413	-27.35%	-36.99%	-33.79%	-28.93%	3.40%				
2007	270	178	549	-7.67%	5.49%	-1.57%	-9.78%	2.68%				
2006	280	176	458	16.89%	15.79%	18.37%	23.48%	2.18%				
2005	199	111	312	12.38%	4.91%	4.55%	4.71%	2.59%				
2004	123	47	125	20.18%	10.88%	18.33%	22.25%	2.69%				
2003	66	15	46	32.13%	28.69%	47.25%	46.03%	4.04%				
2002	41	8	44	-10.15%	-22.10%	-20.48%	-11.43%	4.33%				
2001	31	5	30	32.76%	-11.89%	2.49%	14.02%	6.33%				
2000	19	2	12	7.97%	-9.10%	-3.02%	22.83%	4.05%				
1999	16	2	9	26.02%	21.04%	21.26%	-1.49%	3.92%				

Equity Composite contains fully discretionary equity accounts. Roumell Asset Management, LLC (Roumell) is an opportunistic capital allocator with a deep value bias. Equity accounts can have up to 100% of their assets invested in stocks in the ideal situation where an appropriate number of securities are found that meet Roumell's deep value investment criteria. Historically, these accounts have emphasized common stocks (all cap with a focus on smaller companies). However, Roumell will also selectively purchase a mixture of high yield bonds and discounted closed-end bond funds if it is believed that these offer a favorable risk/reward profile. When fully invested, accounts will hold about 25 to 30 positions. Roumell will hold cash in the absence of sufficient investment opportunities. For comparison purposes, the Equity Composite is measured against the S&P 500, Russell 2000, and Russell 2000 Value Indices. The S&P 500 Index is used for comparative purposes only and is not meant to be indicative of the Equity Composite's performance. In presentations shown prior to March 31, 2005, the composite was also compared against the Nasdaq Index. The benchmark was eliminated since it did not represent the strategy of the composite. The Equity Composite was created January 1, 1999.

Roumell Asset Management, LLC claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) and has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS standards. Roumell Asset Management, LLC has been independently verified by Ashland Partners & Company LLP for the periods January 1, 1999 through September 30, 2012. Verification assesses whether (1) the firm has complied with all the composite construction requirements of the GIPS standards on a firm-wide basis and (2) the firm's policies and procedures are designed to calculate and present performance in compliance with the GIPS standards. The Equity Composite has been examined by Ashland Partners & Company LLP for the periods January 1, 1999 through September 30, 2012. The verification and performance examination reports are available upon request.

Roumell Asset Management, LLC is an independent registered investment adviser. The firm maintains a complete list and description of composites, which is available upon request. Results are based on fully discretionary accounts under management, including those accounts no longer with the firm. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

The U.S. dollar is the currency used to express performance. Returns are presented net of management fees and include the reinvestment of all income. Net of fee performance was calculated using actual management fees. Net returns are reduced by all fees and transaction costs incurred. Wrap fee accounts pay a fee based on a percentage of assets under management. Other than brokerage commissions, this fee includes investment management, portfolio monitoring, consulting services, and in some cases, custodial services. Wrap accounts are included in the composite. As of December 31, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, wrap fee accounts made up 33%, 36%, 31%, 33%, 41%, 40%, and 44% of the composite, respectively. Wrap fee schedules are provided by independent wrap sponsors and are available upon request from the respective wrap sponsor. Returns include the effect of foreign currency exchange rates. Exchange rate source utilized by the portfolios within the composite may vary. Composite performance is presented net of foreign withholding taxes. Withholding taxes may vary according to the investor's domicile.

The annual composite dispersion presented is an asset-weighted standard deviation calculated for the accounts in the composite for the entire year. Dispersion calculations are greater as a result of managing accounts on a client relationship basis. Securities are bought based on the combined value of all portfolios of a client relationship and then allocated to one account within a client relationship. Therefore, accounts within a client relationship will hold different securities. The result is greater dispersion amongst accounts. The 3-year annualized ex-post standard deviation of the composite and/or benchmark is not presented for the period prior to December 31, 2012 because 36 monthly returns are not available. Policies for valuing portfolios, calculating performance, and preparing compliant presentations are available upon request.

The investment management fee schedule for the composite is as follows: for Direct Portfolio Management Services: 1.75% on the first \$200,000, 1.50% on the next \$300,000, and 1.00% on assets over \$500,000; for Sub-Adviser Services: determined by adviser; for Wrap Fee Services: determined by sponsor. Actual investment advisory fees incurred by clients may vary.